Hark Herald Press would like to thank our friend Dirk for bringing this to our attention:

In 2018, the Shenzhen Municipal Government in China gave U.C. Berkeley $220 million, which the school did not disclose.

On March 22, 2023, the Daily Beast reported “Berkeley’s $220M Mistake Exposed in Massive Deal With China Revealed that UC Berkeley “.

“The university has failed to declare a $220 million investment from the municipal government of Shenzhen to build a research campus in China…it had also failed to disclose to the U.S. government a $19 million contract in 2016 with Tsinghua University.

The project is called the Tsinghua-Berkeley Shenzhen Institute (TBSI), a joint research initiative backed by Berkeley and Tsinghua University, a top science school often called “China’s MIT.” … Berkeley never disclosed to the federal government a single cent of the financial support for the TBSI from Chinese sources…”

This is not an isolated incident of mismanagement of foreign funding by a single U.S. university. Instead, it is the result of a grand strategy to acquire Western technology driven by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the United Front Work Department. To fully comprehend the background in which TBSI was formed, we need to dive into:

  1. The sophisticated transnational network United Front operates to facilitate the transfer of technology into China;
  2. How United Front controls and weaponizes Chinese students for this goal;
  3. How this fits into China’s Military Civilian fusion strategy or MCF to boost its military;
  4. How the “competition” with the CCP is unlike the conflict with Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union and Al Queda and that the CCP’s ambition goes much beyond Taiwan;
  5. What caused 2018 to become a significant turning point for a newly designed United Front that many Western observers failed to recognize;
  6. How does the manipulation of the Chinese community and Chinese students align with Xi’s vision, known as the “Great United Front.”

The United Front that emerged after 2018 has become more audacious, assertive, and “innovative.” It has established numerous secret police stations in Western nations, actively interfered in elections in Western countries, and engaged in illicit activities such as money laundering and fentanyl trafficking.

All of these activities align with Xi’s concept of the “Great United Front,” which aims to expand the capabilities and reach of the United Front by incorporating new elements into its operations and infrastructure.

Current China policies pursued by the Western democracies remain outdated as they do not reflect the reality of the post-2018 United Front

For example:

  • To counter China’s technology theft, the attention has primarily been directed towards the Ministry of State Security (MSS), and their internet cyber warfare units, overlooking the crucial role played by the United Front. However, it is the United Front that holds a more influential and strategic position because applying the Bezmenov Model, 85% of China’s intelligence budget would be devoted to the United Front‘s worldwide operations, most of which are conducted through legally registered entities.


Note: Hark Herald provided detailed case study in Part 2 of the series: Chinese Intelligence operatives were at the J6, to show how the left side of this political influence campaign are intricately connected to the operations on the right, some times by the same group of people.

Hark Herald Press has provided comprehensive coverage regarding specific aspects of the United Front‘s activities after 2018, which involve its infiltration into right-wing politics in Western countries, along with global disinformation campaigns targeted towards right-wing audiences. In this report, we will delve into another significant aspect of the United Front:


The following are various programs and infrastructure the United Front utilizes for this specific purpose:

Military-Civilian Fusion and Xi’s New Committee

On Jan 22nd, 2017, Xi Jinping launched the “Central Military-Civilian Fusion Development Committee”, to accelerate the merging of civilian and military technology for China’s future military goals.

What is Military-Civil Fusion?

According to the State Department

“Military-Civil Fusion, or MCF, is an aggressive, national strategy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Its goal is to enable the PRC to develop the most technologically advanced military in the world.”

[Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) is about breaking down barriers between China’s civilian and commercial sectors, and its military and defense sectors. The CCP aims to achieve military dominance, not just through its own research and development, but also through stolen technology transfers from around the world.]

“Key technologies being targeted under MCF include quantum computing, big data, semiconductors, 5G, advanced nuclear technology, aerospace technology, and AI. The PRC specifically seeks to exploit the inherent ‘dual-use’ nature of many of these technologies, which have both military and civilian applications.”

“…Joint research institutions, academia, and private firms are all being exploited to build the PLA’s future military systems—often without their knowledge or consent.”

Xi’s new MCF committee has tremendous implications for the United Front:

  1. United Front has, over decades, constructed a vast transnational network to facilitate technology transfer;
  2. The United Front’s work is an intricate part of the CCP’s political influence operation. Historically, Mao called the United Front Work Department the magic weapon of the CCP. As a devoted disciple of Mao’s hardline ideology, Xi has been personally elevating the United Front to unleash its potential and align the organization with his vision. The CCP completed a massive restructuring of the United Front between 2015 and 2018. This restructuring added more concise control, new areas of operations and resources to the United Front.

Students and Universities-A New United Front Focus to Accomplish MCF

The CCP recognizes the value of overseas Chinese students and scholars as a means to acquire Western technologies. The CCP views the expertise of Chinese students and scholars as vital for its own survival. In comparison to previous regimes, the CCP under Xi has taken more extensive measures to implement sophisticated programs that serve two main purposes:

  1. Stealing technology, and; 
  2. Controlling Chinese students studying abroad.

These efforts support the CCP’s military objectives of challenging and defeating Western powers.

Since 1979 the CCP has expanded the United Front’s surveillance programs to actively engage with overseas Chinese students and scholars. These programs have evolved into a complex ecosystem that offers significant incentives designed to co-opt and influence students and scholars.(Overseas Chinese Students and Scholars in China’s Drive for Innovation)

When Xi Jinping assumed leadership in 2012, he inherited a vast United Front intelligence network. Over the years this network has developed into a clandestine channel that facilitated technology transfer through control of Chinese students and scholars. This was done through generally subtle, and sometimes not so subtle, threats to family members still living in China or financial incentives.

However, Xi was not content with the existing state of affairs. Unlike his predecessors, he felt a greater sense of urgency to propel China into a position of military superiority. He ordered the United Front to intensify their operations in support of his goals.

Xi’s goal is to reach technological parity in key areas by 2050. Xi ordered the adoption of an asymmetric strategy beginning in 2013. An asymmetric strategy implies that any means necessary will be employed, without limitations, to achieve the desired result.

Xi emphasized the need to create additional avenues through which more Chinese students and scholars studying overseas could contribute to his vision. (Source: Overseas Chinese Students and Scholars in China’s Drive for Innovation, October 7th, 2020).

On May 20th, 2015, Xinhua News Agency, CCP’s most important media organ, broadcasted Xi’s views on overseas Chinese students as a source of technological intelligence:

“Xi Jinping emphasized that the work of [attracting Chinese] intellectuals who are not Communist Party Members is fundamental and strategic [to] the United Front….We should encourage overseas students to return to China to work or serve the country in various ways. We need to strengthen and improve our work with influential figures in news media, establish regular channels of communication, enhance online interaction and offline communication…”
Several days later, on May 28th, 2015, Xinhua News Agency again emphasized Xi’s directives:

“…During this conference…Xi Jinping emphasized that overseas students are …a new focus of United Front work. It is necessary to … encourage overseas students to return to China to work or serve the country in various forms.

Establishing campuses in China by renowned Western universities, such as UC Berkeley, aligns perfectly with this vision. Not only has Berkeley long been a target of the United Front, but having a Berkeley campus in China provides ample opportunities for the United Front to engage and exert influence on both the University and its students.

Thus was created TSBI, a joint venture between Berkeley and Tsinghua University, often referred to as China’s MIT. Xi’s desire for technological superiority explains China’s interest in why the TSBI joint venture between China and Berkeley secretly received funding of $220 million from the Chinese government in 2018–to enhance China’s ability to steal technology. Berkeley’s reasons for keeping it secret are unexplained at this time.

To assist in stolen technology transfer, the United Front has constructed a complex network of legally registered, quasi-professional, associations that interconnect with one another. Two crucial networks in this regard are the Western Returned Scholars Association (WRSA,欧美同学会) and the China Association for Science and Technology (CAST,中国科学技术协会).

The WRSA directly reports to the United Front Work Department, while CAST operates under the CPPCC, a quasi-congress controlled by the United Front. These associations serve as channels to connect science and technology experts with the United Front’s network.

According to WRSA’s website, its objective is to:

serve as a link between the Chinese Communist Party and overseas students and scholars, assisting the Party and the government in their interactions with them and providing them with a welcoming environment.

By April 2018, the WRSA had 17 branches in various countries and regions consisting of numerous experts in STEM fields. One of its branches, located in Beijing, has 6,000 members, including alumni from prestigious institutions like Harvard and MIT. As Anastasya Lloyd-Damnjanovic, and Alex Bowe, authors of the report,Overseas Chinese Students and Scholars in China’s Drive for Innovation” revealed:

“According to a Georgetown Center for Security and Emerging Technology study analyzing 208 such Chinese professional associations, 61 percent advertised that they participate in technology transfer, including bringing scientists to China or participating in specific talent programs.”

“WRSA is subordinate to the United Front Work Department (UFWD), the CCP agency tasked with coordinating influence operations at the operational level, while CAST is an official constituent of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the most important institutional embodiment of the United Front.”

The United Front’s role in channeling overseas science and technology expertise toward China’s development has grown since the 2013 directive from Xi to focus on initiating asymmetric operations to incentivize overseas Chinese to contribute their technical skills and expertise to China’s reaching military parity by 2050.

CAST states its mission is to serve “as a bridge that links the Communist Party of China and the Chinese government to the country’s science and technology community.” 

As of April 2018, CAST had established 12 chapters with approximately 8,000 members spread across different regions of the United States. These chapters were located in Arizona, Connecticut, Dallas, Florida, Los Angeles, the greater New York area (New York and New Jersey), North Carolina, Pittsburgh, San Diego, Silicon Valley, Utah, and Washington DC.

Among its programs, the most significant is the “Haizhi Plan”(海智计划), CAST’s outreach initiative to Chinese scholars and students. 

Since 2014, the Haizhi Plan has expanded to incorporate a series of “offshore innovation and entrepreneurship bases.”(离岸创业创新基地)

To facilitate the transfer of Western research projects to China, CAST has established “offshore entrepreneurship bases” in major Chinese cities. These bases are connected to “workstations” located overseas, which are virtual or physical offices of pseudo professional associations controlled by the United Front. At these workstations, Chinese students, scholars, and professionals replicate research similar to their regular work for transmission to China. (Source: Overseas Chinese Students and Scholars in China’s Drive for Innovation, US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Page 20).

According to Andrew Spear, the leader of Strider Technologies’ intelligence team, these overseas workstations upload the information it gathers from Chinese students and scholars to “offshore entrepreneurship bases” in China to benefit startups or existing enterprises inside China. 

Chinese researchers uploading to these workstations may receive compensation. (Source: Overseas Chinese Students and Scholars in China’s Drive for Innovation, US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Page 20)

By April 2018, the United Front had deployed an extensive network of workstations in major technology centers, including Silicon Valley, Boston, and Israel.

In 2019, a new initiative called the National Returnee Innovation and Entrepreneurship Ecosphere Initiative (NRIEEI) was launched by three entities in Beijing. The NRIEEI focuses on fostering collaboration between Chinese engineers who have returned to China and those who remain abroad, encouraging them to share resources and research in order to develop new products. (Source: Overseas Chinese Students and Scholars in China’s Drive for Innovation, US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Page 27).

As the United Front programs grew in scale, scope and sophistication, China’s theft of technology exploded. The Guardian reported on Feb 6th, 2020 China theft of technology is biggest law enforcement threat to US, FBI says:

“The agency’s counterintelligence chief, John Brown, said the bureau arrested 24 people in 2019 in China-related cases and had already arrested 19 people in 2020.

He told the conference at Washington’s Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) that the FBI believed “no country poses a greater threat than Communist China.”

Startups and Industrial Parks

The growing participation of startups in China’s technology theft can be attributed to the fact that an increasing number of Chinese companies are listed in the Western stock markets, which offers significant financial incentives.

Xi Jinping encouraged Chinese students by stating that it would be easier for them to start their own businesses in China rather than abroad.

This injection of capital into technologies stolen from the West to establish startups in China creates a compelling incentive that many young Chinese engineers find difficult to resist.

Consequently, we have witnessed a surge in cases where Chinese engineers engage in the theft of technologies for this specific purpose. Two illustrative examples are:

In July 2017 a former Apple Engineer Zhang Xiaoliang was arrested when he was preparing to go work for a Chinese startup that makes electric cars with autonomous driving features.  Zhang pled guilty in Aug 2022.  (Source: Aug 23, 2020 Japan Times: China-bound ex-Apple engineer admits to trade secrets theft). 

On January 28th, 2019, Chinese engineer Wenfeng Lu pled guilty to charges of stealing technologies from his former employers. He had acquired financing and was preparing to start a company in China, using stolen technology to manufacture devices for treating vascular problems. This incident occurred within a program sponsored by the Chinese government, which aimed to encourage scientists of Chinese descent to return to China and develop biomedical technology using intellectual property obtained from abroad. (Source: (Source: Chinese National Who Stole Trade Secrets while Working for Medical Device Companies Sentenced to Federal Prison)

China Scholarship Council (CSC)

If startups offer the carrot, the Chinese government scholarships and Chinese Student and Scholar Associations carry the stick. 

Chinese students cover the cost of education in the West in three ways:

  1. Scholarships provided by Western universities;
  2. Funds provided by the Chinese government;
  3. Financial support from their families, or other scholarships set up in the Chinese diaspora.

Chinese students funded by the Chinese government are commonly referred to as “Gong Fei” (公费)or “State Funded” students. In contrast, other Chinese students are known as “Zi Fei” (自费) or “Self-Funded” students.

It is important to note that “Gong Fei” or “State Funded” students face strict control and supervision from the Chinese government. As an example, they are required to provide regular updates to the Chinese Embassy or Consulate officers. 

The Chinese government began sending State-Funded students to the United States on December 26th, 1978. At that time, these Chinese students lived on a limited budget and had to seek approval for funding from the Chinese Embassy or Consulates by submitting receipts for their food and lodging expenses.

When the number of Chinese students studying abroad increased rapidly, most of them opted for less controlled paths, such as scholarships offered by graduate schools in the West. This trend resulted in a decline in the popularity of state-funded student programs.

With more private educational funding, China became more dependent on the “Gong Fei, and it got worse for them.

In response to the Tiananmen Massacre, President George H.W. Bush issued Executive Order 12711 in 1990, granting Chinese students in the U.S. permanent residence. This executive order was further reinforced by the Chinese Student Protection Act of 1992 (CSPA). These actions dealt significant blows to the CCP, as almost all State Funded Chinese students took permanent residence visas. The CCP lost control of them.

 The Tiananmen Massacre also caused widespread disillusionment of the CCP. Marxism was no longer accepted as a legitimate ideology.

Facing this setback, the CCP implemented broad changes to adapt to the new reality. It shifted away from Marxism and embraced Nazism and Fascism as alternative ideological pillars supporting its totalitarian rule. 

To keep the State Funded programs relevant, China established the China Scholarship Council (CSC) in 1996. Unlike the Chinese students sent to the US in the 1980’s, who needed to submit their food and lodging expenses to Embassies and Consulates for compensation, recipients of CSC scholarship were given allowances. 

In addition to requiring Gong Fei students to report to the Embassy and Consulates regularly, China embeds in the CSC contracts “patriotic clauses”. 

Hark Herald Press obtained a generic copy of the contract. It stipulated the fund is regularly released to the Chinese student through the Chinese Embassy or Consulate. The contracts require the student to follow the directives of the Chinese Embassies and Consulates, and provide regular updates.


On March 7th, 2023, DW Global Media Forum reported: How China controls its top students in Germany: This was based on its investigation of students holding CSC scholarships sent to schools such as Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU): 

“… the scholar “shall consciously safeguard the honor of the motherland, (and) obey the guidance and management of embassies (consulates) abroad.” This includes reporting to the Chinese embassy or the nearest Chinese consulate within ten days of their arrival in Germany and maintaining “frequent contact.”

They are obliged to regularly document their academic progress and provide reports to the embassy or consulate, which can include obtaining information on third parties. The scholar is required to “promptly update personal information and mentor information” — referring to professors and other academic staff.”

In January 2023, Swedish newspaper Dagens Nyheter reported that Chinese students studying in Sweden and funded by CSC had been required to sign loyalty pledges to the Chinese Communist Party.

On January 20th, 2023, Radio Free Asia reported: Tens of thousands of students pledge loyalty to Beijing before arriving abroad.

Chinese Student and Scholars Association (CSSA)

Aside from those who are state funded, CCP has been exploring ways to engage and control self-funded Chinese students. 

Unlike the State funded students who are subject to patriotic clauses, self-funded Chinese students would not accept draconian and intrusive routines such as regular updates to the Embassy. This is where the Chinese Student and Scholars Associations (CSSA) came into play, as Hark Herald Press has briefly discussed in previous articles and threads on Twitter. (See, @HarkHeraldPress). 

Chinese Student and Scholar Associations present themselves as independent social hubs that assist Chinese students in adapting to life in a foreign country, foster a sense of community among Chinese students on campus, and promote Chinese culture.

Contrary to its purported purpose, researchers have discovered that CSSAs have received significant support from Chinese embassies since their establishment. (Source: James Jiann Hua To, Qiaowu: Extra-Territorial Policies for the Overseas Chinese, Brill Academic Publishers, 2014, 27–29). According to a study published by Foreign Policy on Feb 14th, 2018, CSSA had established by then 150 chapters at universities in the U.S.

Some of the CSSAs, such as the University of California San Diego CSSA, posted publicly on its website that it operated under the guidance of the Chinese Consulate in Los Angeles.

As Alexe Bowe reported in China’s Overseas United Front Work:

“It’s a deliberate strategy to make sure that the Chinese students and scholars living abroad don’t become a problem,” said Anne-Marie Brady, a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, which published Brady’s report last year. The report detailed Chinese Communist Party influence in New Zealand, including the CSSA’s at major universities there.

A former Chinese Ministry of State Security official, Li Fengzhi, who later defected to the United States, said that the Chinese government views CSSAs as a means to conduct “information collection” and propaganda.

Despite the useful social services CSSAs provide for their members, they receive guidance from the CCP through Chinese Embassies and Consulates—governmental ties CSSAs frequently attempt to conceal—and are active in carrying out overseas Chinese work consistent with Beijing’s United Front strategy.

Among self-funded students, those who receive substantial scholarships from Western universities are difficult to control. 

However, those who rely on family finances and other scholarships based in legitimate associations in the Chinese diaspora, are vulnerable to manipulation by CCP, as any disobedience could lead to revocation of the scholarship or severe consequences for their families.

In reviewing the CSSA organization in Berkeley Hark Herald Press observed an obvious red flag: Nearly all of its officers are undergraduate students. Most of them grew up in China, while finishing secondary education in the U.S. or Canada.

Position Birthplace and Childhood Secondary Education Enrollment
Chairman China, Hong Kong China, HK Undergraduate
General Secretary China Undergraduate
PR secretary China US Undergraduate
Info Tech Secretary China US Undergraduate
Social Activity Secretary China China Undergraduate*
Finance Secretary China China, Canada Undergraduate
Academic Secretary China China Undergraduate**
Culture and art secretary Undergraduate
Career secretary Canada, China Undergraduate


* recipient of the Yuyi Scholarship, a China based scholarship issued to students in China.

**this student is from Tsinghua undergraduate program. Berkeley’s partner in forming TSBI.

This body of CSSA officers all belong to the category of “self-funded”. But they are also among the most vulnerable to CCP influence with zero leverage to disobey, or they are from the families favored by the Chinese government in the first place. 

Berkeley is known for its engineering excellence, a profession heavily targeted by the United Front.

Berkeley is certainly not alone. 

Here is the screenshot of an archived version UCSD CSSA site.



Although UCSD Chinese Student and Scholar Association redid its website, it remains an undergraduate association.


United Front has definitely figured out who to target.

As mentioned above, undergraduates from China or new Chinese immigrant families are the most vulnerable to CCP influence.

Unlike graduate schools, especially PhD programs which issues scholarships en masse, undergraduate programs seldom issue scholarship to foreign students. Almost all Chinese undergrads coming on student visa will have to rely on their families or scholarships set up in the Chinese diaspora to pay for their education. Both make them extremely vulnerable to potential CCP intimidation. 

And many families able to send their kids abroad are CCP friends or loyalists in the first place.

United Front has turned a significant body of self funded Chinese students to do the political bidding reliably for CCP.

It is a remarkably successful political influence campaign carried out by a hostile foreign intelligence agency in the past few decades through trial and error, while the West failed to understand how United Front works:

“…in February 2017, after the University of California, San Diego (UCSD) invited the Dalai Lama to give that year’s commencement address, the UCSD CSSA threatened “tough measures to resolutely resist the school’s unreasonable behavior” and claimed it had coordinated with the Chinese Consulate and was “waiting for the advice of the Consulate General” regarding the matter. 

The University of Tennessee CSSA describes itself as apolitical in its charter but requires its members to “fervently love the motherland” and “protect the motherland’s honor and image.”

In order for students from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan to be eligible for CSSA membership at the University of Tennessee, they must “support [China’s] national reunification” and “recognize the ‘One China’ principle,” a stipulation indicating the CSSA’s goals include not just celebrating Chinese heritage and cultural interests but explicitly advocating for Beijing’s foreign policy priorities which, in this case, do not align with the United States’ official interpretation of diplomatic arrangements.*

Source: China’s Overseas United Front Work Background and Implications for the United States by Alexander Bowe, Policy Analyst,  Security and Foreign Affairs, US China Economic and Security Review Commission, page 11

Eric Li- A case study to understand the logic behind China’s influence campaign

Born in Shanghai, Li was sent in 1980 to finish his undergraduate degree in UC Berkeley and later MBA at Stanford. In 1999, Li returned to China and became a venture capitalist. 

Li holds positions in both Berkeley and Tsinghua, the two parties that formed TSBI with Chinese government funding. 

Li’s most notable investment is or, a network focused on spreading ultra-nationalistic, pro-Putin and anti-Taiwan disinformation.

Guancha rose to prominence by platforming top CCP propagandists. On May 1st, 2021 Double Think Lab, a nonprofit organization closely following Guancha, published a detailed report of its history: Tracing control and influence at Guancha news.

That history shows that in March 2014, Li made his most impactful presentation on TED: “A Tale of Two Political Systems.” In the presentation Li attempted to make a case that the political system of the Chinese Communist Party is much more nimble and successful than the American system.

This presentation was featured on every major CCP propaganda channel.

As a devoted supporter of Xi, Li penned articles in Foreign Policy and in the Washington Post, calling Xi a good emperor, and Xi’s 3rd term a good thing.

Li’s ideals closely mirror Xi’s, in that he advocates the theory that not only is the U.S. in decline, and China on the rise, but that China has a historical destiny to defeat and dismantle the free world.

On Dec 1st, 2020, Li delivered a high profile speech to an audience of China’s young and influential nationalists, in which Li concluded the United States was more like the declining Soviet Union during the Cold War. China, on the other hand, is like the U.S.–the winning power of the Cold War.

Li asserted that by copying a strategy George Kennan highlighted in his long telegram regarding the Soviet Union, China could and should finish off the U.S.

As Li laid out in his speech, China views its success and the survival of the western system as mutually exclusive. 

Xi, United Front Restructuring, and Conclusion

Xi’s term has been consequential. People in the West are awakening to an assertive and confrontational China. The hope that economic engagement inevitably leads to political liberalization has been dashed.

However, few are studying the role of the United Front. As has been evidenced by the articles and Twitter threads published and posted over the past 2 ½ years by Hark Herald Press, Josh Rogin of the Washington Post, Dan Friedman of MotherJones and Sarah Blaskey of the Miami Herald, the United Front is the source of the CCP’s main tentacles into the Western world. It is the CCP’s prime intelligence operation and the central information source facilitating the transfer of stolen technology to China.


Just like most in the United States are unaware of United Front’s aggressive infiltration into the right-wing of American politics, people are equally unaware that the United Front has, to a large extent, recovered its lost ground from the backlash against the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre and been restructured into a vast intelligence operation

The engagement and control of Chinese students by the CSSA has become more nimble as a result of the United Front restructuring completed in 2018. 

Most concerning is how FBI counterintelligence might have underestimated the United Front as a grave threat to U.S. national security. U.S. policy is partly to blame. After China assisted the United States in causing the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. softened its approach to the U.S.-China relationship.

Although the concerning testimony was about CIA’s dismissiveness towards United Front, given the high profile scandal of Charles McGonigal , and the fact there is no action taken against even exposed United Front involvement in J6, we have no reason to believe FBI counterintelligence analysts would be any better:

U.S. counterintelligence appears to still follow a pre-2018 approach to Chinese organizations in the United States, without recognizing the drastic changes made since its Restructuring.

This is dangerous, especially when the restructuring of the United Front was aimed at weaponizing its overseas Chinese students and scientists to gather research and technology, through additional control, threats to their families and commercial incentives.

All of this is a part of Xi’s strategy to create a Chinese future where China is the dominant military world power, and rejuvenate the Chinese nation at the expense of Western civilization.

 (Additional Sources:

  1. The Role of Technology Transfers in China’s Defense Technological and Industrial Development and the Implications for the United States
  2. Technology Transfers to the PRC Military and US Counter Measures)

More to come.

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